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SYMPOSIUM 
REVOLUTION IN THE REGULATION  
OF FINANCIAL ADVICE:  
THE U.S., THE U.K. AND AUSTRALIA 
INTRODUCTION 
FRANCIS J. FACCIOLO† 
This Symposium brought together legal academics, 
practicing lawyers and business people to discuss new directions 
in the regulation of financial advice to retail investors.  Recently, 
this has been the subject of many initiatives around the world.  
The Symposium examined three of these initiatives in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Australia.  In the U.S., the 
approach historically has been based on disclosure to manage 
conflicts of interest.  Although the U.K. and Australia have not 
done away with disclosure, they have moved to banning certain 
practices, especially in the area of compensation to investment 
advisers from product providers that can result in conflicts of 
interest between an investment adviser and its clients. 
The initiatives in the United States have grown out of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”) and Department of Labor 
initiatives involving pension funds regulated by ERISA.  Dodd-
Frank mandated that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) conduct two studies of investment advisers and broker-
dealers.  In section 913 of Dodd-Frank, Congress directed the 
SEC to study “the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory 
standards of care for brokers, dealers, [and] investment 
advisers . . . for providing personalized investment advice and 
recommendations about securities to retail customers” and 
 
† Francis Facciolo is on the faculty of the St. John’s University School of Law. 
He was the originator of this Symposium and the chair of the committee that 
organized it. He is the Assistant Director of the Securities Arbitration Clinic and 
writes and teaches in the area of asset management. 
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possible “legal or regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps in 
[such] legal . . . standards.”1  The resulting study is normally 
referred to as the Section 913 Study.  In section 914 of Dodd-
Frank, Congress directed the SEC to “review and analyze the 
need for enhanced examination and enforcement resources for 
investment advisers.”2  The resulting study is normally referred 
to as the Section 914 Study.  The first two panels of the 
Symposium were devoted to issues raised by the Section 913 
Study and Section 914 Study. 
Independently of Dodd-Frank, the Department of Labor 
(“DoL”) has pursued its own initiatives involving ERISA 
regulated plans.  We were exceptionally pleased that Phyllis C. 
Borzi, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Employee Benefits Security 
Administration, presented the keynote speech at the Symposium.  
Unlike the SEC, the DoL does not regularly publish speeches by 
its senior employees; therefore, her speech is not being published 
in the Symposium issue.  But one can get a good feel for the 
Department of Labor’s approach to the issues from Borzi’s 
testimony before the House of Representatives on July 26, 2011.  
Borzi noted that  
[u]nder the [Department of Labor] regulation [defining 
investment advice], a person is a fiduciary under ERISA and/or 
the tax code . . . only if they: (1) make recommendations on 
investing in, purchasing or selling securities or other property, 
or give advice as to their value; (2) on a regular basis; 
(3) pursuant to a mutual understanding that the advice; (4) will 
serve as a primary basis for investment decisions; and (5) will 
be individualized to the particular needs of the plan.3  
This five factor test is very restrictive as each element must be 
met “for each instance of advice” for a fiduciary duty to be 
imposed on an investment adviser.4  The proposed DoL rule5 
 
1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 913(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1824 (2010). 
2 Id. § 914(a)(1). 
3 Redefining ‘Fiduciary’: Assessing the Impact of the Labor Department’s 
Proposal on Workers and Retirees: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Emp’t, 
Labor, & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 112th Cong. 8 (2011) 
(statement of Phyllis Borzi, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Employee Benefits 
Security Administration) [hereinafter Borzi Hearing]. 
4 Id. (emphasis added). 
5 Employee Benefits Security Administration Definition of the Term 
“Fiduciary,” 75 Fed. Reg. 65263 (proposed Oct. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 2510). 
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would “(1) replac[e] the five-part test with a broader definition 
more in keeping with the statutory language; and (2) provid[e] 
clear exceptions for conduct that should not result in fiduciary 
status.”6 
The proposed rule proved to be very controversial and it was 
withdrawn by the Department of Labor in September 2011.7  
Currently, the Department of Labor is considering proposing a 
revised rule, although it is unclear when the new rule will be 
released. 
The United Kingdom and Australia have also been pursuing 
radical reforms of the regulation of financial advice given to 
retail customers.  The purpose of these reforms is to restrict 
compensation practices for investment advisers that might 
influence the advice that they give to retail customers because of 
their compensation arrangements with financial product 
producers.  The third panel of the Symposium was devoted to 
issues raised by these international developments. 
One of the issues that was raised, but not addressed, by the 
papers presented in the first two panels was why Dodd-Frank 
contained anything related to investment advice.  The first panel 
was entitled “The Future of Fiduciary Duties for Financial 
Advice.”  The papers in this panel addressed the advantages and 
disadvantages of a fiduciary standard as applied to broker-
dealers.  This new standard would bring broker-dealers and 
investment advisers under a single umbrella with both groups 
held to a fiduciary relationship with their clients, as opposed to 
the current suitability standard for broker-dealers and the 
current fiduciary standard for investment advisers.  Even those 
papers that advocated for such a standard did not explore how 
such a standard was related to the financial crisis that 
commenced in 2008 and provided the impetus for Dodd-Frank. 
As the legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act is so sparse, 
perhaps the concern was that institutions such as Goldman 
Sachs were structuring financial products in such a way as to 
disadvantage certain buyers of these products.  Presumably, a 
fiduciary could not structure products in such a way and then sell 
them to its own customers.  But the buyers of these products 
 
6 Borzi Hearing, supra note 3, at 13. 
7 Press Release, Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Labor Department’s ESBA To Re-Propose 
Rule on Definition of a Fiduciary (Sept. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/EBSA20111382.htm. 
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were also sophisticated investors and the lawsuits by these 
buyers have foundered on the fact that there was proper 
disclosure of the dangers presented by such products.  One 
should not be surprised by such a result as, under American 
black letter law, at least, informed consent of a principal to 
actions by an agent such as a broker immunizes the agent from 
liability for those actions.8 
The first panel addressed the issue of whether brokers 
should be held to the same fiduciary duty standard that 
investment advisers are held to under the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), the issue studied by the SEC in the 
Section 913 Study.  All but one of the papers delivered in the first 
panel assumed that the imposition of such a standard would 
have a material impact on the brokerage business and differed 
over whether such an impact was good for the investing public.  
To simplify what are complicated arguments, the proponents of a 
fiduciary standard assume that a fiduciary standard would 
improve investment advice by the very nature of the standard.  
In other words, the authors adopt a Platonic position and assume 
that a legal principle such as a fiduciary standard will logically 
lead to changes in how investment advice is rendered.  The 
opponents make a similarly Platonic assumption but assume that 
a fiduciary standard would lead to changes in investment advice, 
rendering it too expensive for many small investors. 
I encourage future debate to move from the Platonic to the 
Aristotlean.  In my view, rather than discussing abstractly how 
the fiduciary principle is a favorable principle for individual 
investors or damages some parts of the financial services 
industry, it would help if the debate focused in detail on how 
such a standard would actually operate.  We, therefore, could get 
some sense of what the expected costs and benefits might be.  For 
example, does the fiduciary duty principle have any current 
impact in arbitrations between FINRA members and their 
customers?  This question was raised several times by panel 
members and no clear answer was forthcoming.  All that was 
clear from the panelists’ answers is that arbitration pleadings  
 
 
 
8 See Francis J. Facciolo, Do I Have a Bridge for You: Fiduciary Duties and 
Financial Advice 3 (June 21, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2283200.  
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often contain allegations of breaches of fiduciary duty.  But no 
panel member was willing to speculate about whether such 
allegations were important in arbitration decisions. 
Ryan Baktiari, Katrina Boice, and Jeffrey S. Majors, in their 
article entitled The Time for a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Is Now, 
present an excellent overview of how the debate on fiduciary 
duties for broker-dealers has developed since 2008 and the 
RAND Report that documented the confusion experienced by 
retail investors in distinguishing broker-dealers from investment 
advisers.9 
Paul Walsh, in his article entitled Can the Retail Investor 
Survive the Fiduciary Standard?, pushes the story back to the 
1990s, when broker-dealers began to create fee-based accounts 
and, therefore, moved away from commission-based 
compensation.  The SEC favored this movement because it 
diminished the motivations for broker-dealers to churn a 
brokerage account for the commission income that it generated.  
At the same time, these new fee-based accounts raised an issue of 
whether the sponsoring broker-dealers were no longer able to 
take advantage of the exemption from registration as an 
investment adviser contained in section 202(a)(11)(C) of the 
Advisers Act.  The SEC issued Rule 202(a)(11)-1.  This rule was 
successfully challenged by an investment adviser trade group in 
Financial Planning Association v. SEC, which vacated the rule.10 
Christine Lazaro, in her article entitled The Future of 
Financial Advice: Eliminating the False Distinction Between 
Brokers and Investment Advisers, gives a detailed analysis of the 
different statutory regimes covering broker-dealers and 
investment advisers and the differences in the standards of care 
in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and the 
Advisers Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.  She notes 
that, despite the convoluted intellectual journey to the conclusion 
that section 206 of the Advisers Act creates a federal fiduciary 
duty for investment advisers, the Supreme Court arrived at this 
conclusion in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis.  In 
contrast, broker-dealers do not have a general fiduciary duty 
under federal securities law because the general anti-fraud 
provision of the Exchange Act, section 10(b), contains a scienter 
 
9 Ryan K. Bakhtiari et al., The Time for a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Is Now, 
87.2/3 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 313, 319 (2013). 
10 Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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requirement.  As a matter of black letter law, violations of 
fiduciary duties do not necessarily require that the fiduciary act 
with scienter. 
Andrew Melnick, in his article entitled What’s in a Name: 
The Battle over a Uniform Fiduciary Standard for Investment 
Advisers and Broker-Dealers, carefully considers some of the 
practical difficulties that broker-dealers will face if a uniform 
fiduciary duty is adopted.  He urges the SEC to clarify that 
“receipt of a commission does not create a violation of the 
proposed fiduciary standard in and of itself.”11  Melnick concedes 
that Dodd-Frank already so provides but he is concerned that, as 
part of litigation, arbitration, or regulatory action, the argument 
might be made that “putting the client in a particular product, 
account, or strategy [might not be in the client’s best interests] 
when there was a lower-cost alternative available”;12 therefore, 
he recommends more detailed guidance from the SEC on 
commissions.  In addition, he is very concerned that the Dodd-
Frank proscription against requiring any ongoing monitoring of a 
client’s account or investment strategy, absent an agreement to 
do so, be clearly defined in any SEC rules. 
Baktiari and Lazaro favor a uniform fiduciary standard, in 
large part due to the difficulty that clients have in distinguishing 
broker-dealers from investment advisers.  Although there 
certainly is an argument for avoiding retail investor confusion, it 
is difficult to know how a uniform standard would actually affect 
broker-dealer practices.  Walsh is opposed to any uniform 
fiduciary standard.  He fears that small investors will be denied 
any advice, as the fiduciary model of advice is inherently more 
expensive than a transaction-by-transaction model of advice.  As 
he summarizes his view:  “How could a fiduciary standard, which 
would require disinterested investment advice, be reconciled with 
a compensation structure linked to the product?  It would not be 
reconciled; the average investor will lose access to transactional 
investment brokers, and access to professional investment advice 
would be limited to the wealthy.”13  Melnick shares the same 
 
11 Andrew Melnick, What’s in a Name: The Battle over a Uniform Fiduciary 
Standard for Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, 87.2/3 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 415, 
433 (2013). 
12 Id. 
13 Paul R. Walsh & David W. Johns, Can the Retail Investor Survive the 
Fiduciary Standard?, 87.2/3 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 437, 449 (2013). 
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concerns but believes that a uniform standard is inevitable and 
that broker-dealers should make sure that SEC “rules are 
sufficiently flexible to account for the broker-dealer business 
model.”14 
Lazaro raises one possibility that is worth further 
exploration.  She suggests that we need “a new regulatory 
scheme, . . . a Financial Advice Act.”15  The Financial Advice Act 
would distinguish between trading accounts, where presumably 
the traditional duties of providing suitable recommendations and 
best execution would still apply, and investment accounts, where 
both a duty of loyalty and a duty of care would apply.  She argues 
that the form of compensation should not determine how an 
account is characterized; rather, what should matter is what the 
retail investor expects from the financial professional advising 
her.  One can imagine legislation requiring that the different 
types of accounts have different specified names, much like 
attorney trust accounts have specified names, with corresponding 
disclosure to the retail investor and legislative duties imposed on 
the financial professional.  Again, one can imagine the “FDIC 
insured” and “non-FDIC insured” as a model for this.  I hope that 
Lazaro will further develop her ideas on this subject in a future 
article. 
Mercer Bullard, in his article entitled The Fiduciary 
Standard: It’s Not What It Is, But How It’s Made, Measured, and 
Decided, looks outside of the narrow confines of the debate over 
fiduciary duties to suggest that a legal standard has meaning 
only if it can be enforced.  Arbitration between a customer and a 
broker-dealer is the predominant form of dispute resolution for 
customer disputes in the financial services industry.  Arbitrators, 
under FINRA rules, however, do not have to provide reasoned 
decisions.  Thus, it would be almost impossible to know what a 
new section 913 fiduciary duty would mean.  Here, Bullard 
makes the sensible suggestion that the SEC exercise the 
authority granted to it by Congress in Dodd-Frank over 
mandatory arbitrations in the financial services industry “to 
 
14 Melnick, supra note 11, at 435. 
15 Christine Lazaro, The Future of Financial Advice: Eliminating the False 
Distinction Between Brokers and Investment Advisers, 87.2/3 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 381, 
413 (2013). 
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adopt rules requiring arbitrators to explain their decisions.”16  
Only then would we be able to evaluate what a new section 913 
fiduciary duty, if it were adopted, would actually mean in 
practice and whether it would be an effective or appropriate 
standard for investor protection. 
Bullard also examines whether the SEC or FINRA will be 
the organization that guides the development of the fiduciary 
duty standard.  First, he discusses the role of cost-benefit 
analysis in SEC rulemaking and asks whether, under the guise 
of cost-benefit analysis, libertarian values, which question the 
value of restricting individual choice, may not be driving the 
debate over issues such as fiduciary duties.  As Bullard points 
out, a libertarian might view “mandatory disclosure under a 
fiduciary duty . . . [as] deny[ing] investors the freedom to contract 
privately for such disclosure while making them pay the costs of 
disclosure regardless of whether they need it.”17  Bullard implies 
that a libertarian philosophy is the real motive behind the 
emphasis on cost-benefit analysis.  In other words, cost-benefit 
analysis is being used by many opponents of further regulation of 
financial services as a screen for what are really libertarian 
objections to this regulation. 
Second, Bullard argues that the political forces that have 
buffeted the SEC, often using cost-benefit analysis as their 
standard, may lead FINRA to be more important than the SEC 
in developing fiduciary law.  Many of the freedoms from political 
pressures that FINRA enjoys, notably freedom from funding 
pressures and from the Administrative Procedure Act, which are 
also discussed by David Tittsworth in his article on a self-
regulatory organization for investment advisers, allow FINRA 
more freedom to regulate than the SEC enjoys.  Bullard 
speculates that this freedom has allowed FINRA to move toward 
a fiduciary-type standard in its suitability rule, Rule 2111, and 
the guidance that FINRA has issued with respect to the rule. 
Subsequent to this Symposium, on March 1, 2013, the SEC 
released a Request for Data and Other Information (the “RFI”) in 
which it sought “particular quantitative data and economic 
analysis, relating to the benefits and costs that could result from 
various alternative approaches regarding the standards of 
 
16 Mercer Bullard, The Fiduciary Standard: It’s Not What It Is, But How It’s 
Made, Measured, and Decided, 87.2/3 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 337, 378 (2013). 
17 Id. at 345. 
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conduct and other obligations of broker-dealers and investment 
advisers.”18  The structure of this request has raised concerns 
among advocates for a fiduciary standard that any standard 
based on the “RFI assumptions . . . would be weaker than that 
originally set forth in the Section 913 Study and far less 
stringent than that currently imposed under the Advisers Act.  
Indeed, the RFI seems to contemplate little more than the 
existing suitability standard supplemented by some conflict of 
interest disclosures.”19  Comments are due on the RFI by July 5, 
2013.  As of July 5, 2013, several hundred comment letters had 
been received, although many are duplicative form letters.  It is 
unclear whether the SEC will issue a proposed rule after the 
comment period closes or, if a proposed rule were to be issued, 
what its content would be. 
The second panel, entitled “The Structure of Regulation for 
Investment Advisers: A Self-Regulatory Organization or Not?”, 
addressed the issue of changes that should be made to the 
institutional structure for regulating investment advisers.  
Concern that the SEC does not have adequate resources to 
inspect and examine investment advisers has given rise to this 
issue.  Pursuant to congressional mandate in the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the SEC issued the Section 914 Study on this problem and 
set out three possible solutions: increased funding for the SEC 
through user fees charged to SEC-registered investment 
advisers; a self-regulatory organization for investment advisers 
similar to FINRA for broker-dealers; and, as a variation on the 
SRO proposal, allowing FINRA to function as the SRO for 
investment advisers.  Competing proposed bills have been 
introduced in Congress on user fees and FINRA as a SRO for 
investment advisers.  Neither bill has made it to a committee 
hearing.  The bill making FINRA an SRO was actually 
withdrawn by its sponsor, Representative Bacchus, although 
there have been rumors that it may be reintroduced. 
 
 
18 Duties of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisors, Exchange Act Release 
No. 69,013, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3558, 2013 WL 771910, at *1 (Mar. 
1, 2013). 
19 Letter from Joyce A. Rogers, Senior Vice President, AARP, et al., to Mary Jo 
White, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (June 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-3063.pdf. 
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David Tittsworth, in his article entitled H.R. 4624: The 
Pitfalls of a Self-Regulatory Organization for Investment Advisers 
and Why User Fees Would Better Accomplish the Goal of 
Investment Adviser Accountability, makes a strong plea for the 
user fee approach.  In his role as Executive Director and 
Executive Vice President of the Investment Adviser Association, 
a major trade organization of investment advisers, Tittsworth is 
a prominent participant in the debate over the form of 
investment adviser regulation.  In this article, he expresses 
strong opposition to an SRO for investment advisers.  Tittsworth 
does a close analysis of the Bacchus bill, but the conclusions that 
he draws are more generally applicable to any use of an SRO for 
investment advisers.  Tittsworth’s opposition to an SRO is based 
in part on the fact that the SRO model has not been shown to be 
effective for broker-dealers.  Further, SROs “are not subject to 
requirements related to the Administrative Procedure Act . . . , 
the public records laws, due process, the Freedom of Information 
Act, cost-benefit analysis, and other critical protections” for the 
public.20  He is also concerned that an SRO would cost more than 
increased funding of the SEC and that these increased costs 
would particularly impact investment advisers, as so many of 
them are small businesses.  Finally, Tittsworth raises the issue 
that broker-dealers, who are currently regulated by FINRA, 
perform a different role in the financial services industry (the 
sell-side) than investment advisers (the buy-side).  Therefore, 
FINRA would have conflicts of interest when it regulates both. 
Anita Krug, in her article entitled Rethinking U.S. 
Investment Adviser Regulation, steps back from the debate 
arising out of the Section 914 Study and proposes that we 
rethink investment adviser regulation in general.  She uses a 
series of case studies of problems with the current regulation of 
investment advisers to highlight the need for a fundamental 
change in such regulation.  As Krug sees it, investment adviser 
regulation is the result of the accretion of piecemeal solutions to 
problems that have created a structure that is “too complex and 
 
20 David G. Tittsworth, H.R. 4624: The Pitfalls of a Self-Regulatory 
Organization for Investment Advisers and Why User Fees Would Better Accomplish 
the Goal of Investment Adviser Accountability, 87.2/3 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 477, 483 
(2013). 
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too incoherent.”21  From her perspective, “[b]etter investment 
adviser regulation—that is, more effective and efficient investor 
protection and promotion of market integrity—requires, in some 
sense, returning to square one and thinking critically about what 
that regulation should be and what it should accomplish.”22 
In a recent article published in the Columbia Law Review,23 
Krug has presented one principle that she believes should 
underlie financial services regulation, including investment 
adviser regulation that is hinted at in her article for the 
Symposium.  Her more recent article argues that we should not 
automatically focus on entity-specific rules.  Rather, we should 
consider how a regulated area actually functions when 
determining how to regulate that area.  As one simple example, 
Krug suggests that investment company registration perhaps 
should not be focused on the investment company but rather on 
the investment adviser to the investment company.  Her point is 
that, since  
a mutual fund may be viewed merely as a facilitating structure, 
one that allows the fund’s investment adviser to provide 
advisory services to the fund’s shareholders[,] . . . directing 
regulatory obligations toward those who control the fund [the 
investment adviser] and are responsible for its existence and 
ongoing operations may better promote regulatory goals.24 
The third panel, entitled “International Issues in the 
Regulation of Financial Advice,” discussed international 
developments in investment adviser regulation.  The first two 
articles describe how the reforms in Australia and the U.K. 
actually dictate the fashion in which investment advice will be 
given to small investors.  This is in contrast to relying on 
principles governing such advice, which is the underlying 
premise of the Section 913 Study, or strengthening regulatory 
oversight, which is the underlying premise of the Section 914 
Study.  The Australian reforms have gone forward under the 
rubric of the Future of Financial Advice (“FOFA”), while the U.K. 
 
21 Anita K. Krug, Rethinking U.S. Investment Adviser Regulation, 87.2/3 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 451, 476 (2013). 
22 Id. 
23 Anita K. Krug, Escaping Entity-Centrism in Financial Services Regulation, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 2039 (2013). 
24 Id. at 2054. 
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reforms have gone forward as the Retail Distribution Review.25  
The third article discusses the impact of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Morrison decision on investment adviser regulation and 
the reach of domestic U.S. regulation.  The third panel raises the 
issue of whether, at least for retail investors, there should be 
substantive restrictions on certain compensation practices that 
might create conflicts for investment advisers between their own 
interests and the interests of their clients.  The approach in the 
U.S. has been to favor disclosure of such conflicts by investment 
advisers to their clients.  Although disclosure has played and 
continues to play a role in the U.K. and Australia, the balance 
has shifted to prescriptive regulation of practices when retail 
investors are involved. 
Richard Batten and Gail Pearson, in their article entitled 
Financial Advice in Australia: Principles to Proscriptions; 
Managing to Banning, provide a detailed review of the initiatives 
that have been undertaken in Australia under the rubric of the 
FOFA.  As they note, there is a compulsory superannuation 
system in Australia for retirement, what we would call a 
compulsory defined contribution system, that places market risk 
on individuals.  Due to this compulsory system, financial advice 
plays a “vital” role in Australia.  The regulatory regime in 
Australia has moved from a principles-based system to one in 
which explicit regulation of certain practices as well as principles 
are applied.  As summarized by Batten and Pearson, the 
legislation enacting the FOFA has several components: 
(1) to act in the best interests of the client; (2) to follow 
prescribed steps to meet the best interests obligation; (3) to 
reach and give appropriate advice through meeting the best 
interests obligation; (4) in case of a conflict of interest, to give 
priority to the interests of the client; (5) to ban conflicted 
remuneration, volume-based benefits, shelf fees, and asset-
based fees on borrowed monies; and (6) to require that every 
two years, clients must opt-in to any ongoing fee arrangement.   
 
 
 
 
 
25 For a brief, general description of these two reform efforts, see Francis J. 
Facciolo, The Revolution in Investment Adviser Regulation, 18 THE INVESTMENT 
LAW., no 10, Oct. 2011. 
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The first four obligations are linked and generally fall on 
individuals.  The remuneration rules are not restricted to 
individuals.26 
What the FOFA does not have is an explicit statement that 
investment advisers owe a fiduciary duty to their clients, 
although fiduciary duty had been part of the debate leading up to 
the legislation.27  Batten and Pearson do make some interesting 
observations about Australian concepts of fiduciary duties in the 
investment advice context.  They also describe the superseded 
rules that “required financial services licensees to give only 
‘appropriate advice,’ ” which is very much like the U.S. concept of 
suitability that is applied to brokers and their interactions with 
clients.28 
The initiatives leading up to the FOFA legislation have led 
to some interesting writing on the nature of fiduciary duties, 
which Batten and Pearson mention and which should be of 
interest to U.S.-based practitioners and academics.  Gerard 
Craddock takes the view that legislation cannot be the basis of 
fiduciary duties, as they are so fact specific.  Indeed, “[s]tatutory 
fiduciary duties stand the law of fiduciaries on its head.  Careful 
fact-finding . . . is eliminated, and with it the capacity to 
determine precisely the adviser’s obligations in context.”29  He 
particularly criticizes the prescriptive approach to the best 
interests obligation taken by the FOFA legislation.  This 
approach provides a safe harbor to an investment adviser if it 
follows the prescribed steps in providing advice.30  Craddock is 
concerned that “[o]ne risk with statutory prescription is that it 
may promote minimum compliance.  Another is that it may 
stultify the development of the role of the common law in 
promoting professional quality via the standard of care.”31  His 
solution is to strengthen the disclosure of conflicts provided to 
 
26 Richard Batten & Gail Pearson, Financial Advice in Australia: Principles to 
Proscription; Managing to Banning, 87.2/3 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 511, 514 (2013) 
(footnotes omitted). 
27 Gerard Craddock, The Ripoll Committee Recommendation for a Fiduciary 
Duty in the Broader Regulatory Context, 30 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 216, 220, 222, 233 
(2012). For more background on the FOFA, see Andrew J. Serpell, The Future of 
Financial Advice Reforms, 30 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 240, 24041 (2012). 
28 Batten & Pearson, supra note 26. 
29 Craddock, supra note 27, at 222. 
30 Batten & Pearson, supra note 26, at 524–30 (describing best interests and 
appropriate advice obligations). 
31 Craddock, supra note 27, at 235. 
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retail investors.  Craddock’s model for this strengthened 
disclosure are the disclosures contained in the Form ADV Part 2 
required for registration with the SEC.32 
Gerard McMeel, in his article entitled International Issues in 
the Regulation of Financial Advice: A United Kingdom 
Perspective—The Retail Distribution Review and the Ban on 
Commission Payments to Financial Intermediaries, provides a 
rich history of the regulation of financial advice in the U.K. 
leading up to the Retail Distribution Review, before describing 
the RDR.  As in Australia, the U.K. has moved to a system of 
banning product providers from providing commissions to 
investment advisers in order to encourage sales of their products.  
McMeel reminds us that the U.K. operates within a European 
context and that various European Union Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directives have played a large role in shaping the 
U.K. reforms.  Finally, McMeel reviews English fiduciary law, 
focusing on the receipt of benefits, such as secret commissions, by 
fiduciaries. 
Arthur Laby, in his article entitled Regulation of Global 
Financial Firms After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 
discusses the regulatory impact of Morrison rather than the 
impact of Morrison on enforcement of the federal securities laws 
through either lawsuits or administrative procedures.  He is 
concerned with discerning the impact on U.S. regulation of both 
non-U.S. domiciled investment advisers and broker-dealers.  
Laby carefully lays out the implications of Morrison and then 
applies them to the doctrines that the SEC has relied upon in 
regulating these two groups.  His conclusion is that the current 
regulatory structure has been demolished by Morrison as 
“[r]egulation of non-U.S. advisers depends heavily on the conduct 
and effects test . . . [and] [r]egulation of non-U.S. brokers 
assumes the Exchange Act applies extraterritorially in face of 
congressional silence.”33  As the Supreme Court “unmistakably 
rejected the conduct and effects test and forcefully asserted a 
presumption against extraterritoriality,” the SEC’s regulatory  
 
 
 
32 Id. at 237–38. 
33 Arthur B. Laby, Regulation of Global Financial Firms After Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank, 87.2/3 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 561, 594 (2013). 
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regime rests on quicksand.34  Laby does suggest two possible 
rulemaking fixes under the Exchange Act for the broker-dealer 
problem.  He does not suggest any fix under the Advisers Act. 
In discussing Morrison and its impact on the regulation of 
investment advisers, Laby discusses SEC v. Gruss,35 in which the 
district court held that Morrison does not apply to an action 
under the Advisers Act.  Laby makes a strong argument for why 
Gruss was incorrectly decided.  But what is not clear from his 
article is that Gruss has been cited approvingly at least seven 
times, both in cases involving the Advisers Act36 and in cases 
involving other federal statutes.37  In addition, there does not 
appear to be a single published case that disapproves of the 
Gruss reasoning.  Although the Gruss reasoning has not been 
tested at the circuit court level, it has achieved some real traction 
at the trial level. 
 
 
34 Id. 
35 SEC v. Gruss, 859 F. Supp. 2d 653, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
36 SEC v. Amerindo Inv. Advisors, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 5231(RJS), 2013 WL 
1385013, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2013); SEC v. Ficeto, No. CV 111637GHK(RZx), 
2013 WL 1196356, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2013); SEC v. ICP Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 
10 Civ. 4791(LAK), 2012 WL 2359830, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2012); Lloyd v. 
Metro. W. Asset Mgmt., LLC, B238724, 2013 WL 136237, at * 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 
11, 2013). 
37 SEC v. Tourre, No. 10 Civ. 3229(KBF), 2013 WL 2407172, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 4, 2013); Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, No. 12 Civ. 336(JPO), 2013 WL 
1285421, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. 
Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 480 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
